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Abstract
Whether  and when does  banking serve  to stabilize the  which  empower the private sector-also  appear to reduce
economy?  Caiofpi10  dIU  rILVIIil  VieW  LIIe  Ubing  system  theI  secoLL'  aSilLy  oL  pLrv-d  WhVLL-t-  -i  -
as a  filter through which foreign  and domestic  shocks  macroeconomy.  It is as if prudent bankers are  reluctant
feed through to the domestic  economy.  T he filter can  to absorb short-term  risks that, if  negiected,  might cause
dampen or amplify the shocks  through various credit  solvency  and growth problems in  the longer  run.
market channels, including  credit growth, import of  Forbearance  might dampen  short-term volatility, but at
foreign capltal,  and possibly interest rates. The question  the expense of the longer run health of the banking
is whether the prudential  quality of banklng,  as proxied  sector and the economy.  One way to avoid this apparent
by measures  of regulatory quality  and openness  to  tradeoff is evident:  banking systems which have  a higher
foreign  banking, amplify or dampen these  shocks.  share  of foreign-owned  banks, a feature already
The authors find that many of the regulatory  associated  Txiith  financial deepemnina  ntoAIwered  risk of
characteristics  that have  been found to deepen  a financial  crisis, also seem to score  well in  terms of short-term
system and make  it more robust to crises-notably  those  macroeconomic  Iinsuiatilon.
This  paper-a  joint product  of Finance,  Development  Research  Group,  and  the Financial  Sector  Strategy  and  Policy
Department-is  part of a  larger effort  in  the  Bank to analyze  bank regulation  and supervision.  Copies of the paper are
available  free from the World Bank,  1818  H Street NW, Washington,  DC 20433. Please contact Agnes Yaptenco, room
MC3-446,  telephone  202-473-1823,  fax  202-522-1155,  email  address  ayaptenco@worldbank.org.  Policy  Research
Working, Paners  are  also  nosted  on  the  Weh  at  http://econ.worldbank.org.  The  authors  may  be  contacted  at
gcaprio@worldbank.org  or phonohan@worldbank.org.  June 2002.  (37 pages)
The Policy Research Working Paper  Series disseminates the findings of work tn progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about
development Issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if tne presentations are  less than fully polished. TIne
papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations,  and conclusions expressed in this
pap  aretIrC-y those of  Uthe  athor.  Thy dot  not;recessar;y represent  the view of the Wor!d Bank  t  Er-"xe-"".-  e
countries they represent.
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0  g'  L  __I.  Introduction
In view of the depressing record of the last two decades with banking crises around the
world and, in particular, in emerging markets, and it is understandable that authorities are
interested  iih ""hethr  er^t  (and  r  w  hen)  bankn  serves+  oth;o  th  onrAv  orJntv  e 
crisis of bank insolvency has the potential io push the economy into a siump, in what is
the most extreme form of credit-driven macroeconomic cycle.  This is an example of bad
banking worsening macroeconomic performance,  and episodes -in which banks are
alleged to contribute to booms or asset bubbles are not difficult to find as well. But could
some forms of "good" banking also have a destabilizing role?
For example, worsening creditworthiness conditions as a slump gets under way
can lead a cautiously managed bank to raise its credit quality thresholds and shift to safe
assetq such as govemnment hnnds; the enquinor cretlit crnnch can exacerbate  a downturn
. 1002.  C  .Q..l.a  T  . I n n  l.  ...  ..  ti._
%ji%,LLjLG.LU%L',  I  7JUJ_P  LIejLIkCM%U-L  V~VV1L,  I  77i  II  W  UJ1I,  177.)).  ilarL  UPLUIII  UIV,
opposite can be the case, with increasing confidence triggering a relaxation of credit
standards and a surge of credit driving the economy even higher - and amplifying credit
cycles.  Some authors have noted that the tightness of supervisory guidelines  can act in
the same pro-cyclical way (cf. Berger et al. 2001).
Unfortunately,  in assessing the importance of each of these models in practice, the
econometrician  is faced with difficult problems.  While banking crises can contribute to a
subsequent output dip, it is equally true that adverse output shocks can trigger a banking
rr;eis(MTFAI  1 Q9  Hognarcth et al.  2)OAfl  flistanctinengcr ca21ep  ani  Pffpnt ie  wvu  Aifficil
in puctice.  LiKeWiSC,  iL is -us-aniy naru to ucLemUne  whether a particuiar decline i  credi
can be attributed to demand or supply shocks.  The relevant structural equations areusually not well determined, as evidenced from the large literature on the East Asia crisis
and the potential role of a credit crunch there (Agenor et al., 2000;  Ding et al.,  1998).
An alternative approach to addressing the question of good banking and macro
OLCL;LJL  At  A  LW  LU  MALLF  OWL&&_  1LOLL  LJ.LA%.JAIO  V.  r  tJ  ;  AL1  t  %JM  LAL  LA  A  C  V  fl  -
performance of economies by reference to tnese instruments.  Tne advantage of tuis
approach is that it can provide guidance as to the type of banking system that government
officials could expect to maximize stabilizing influences.  Two distinct types of
instrument on which some data are available are (i) the nature of bank regulation and (ii)
presence of, or openness to, foreign bank ownership.'
Already there is a literature on the cross-country contribution of financial depth to
macroeconomic  stability (Easterly, Islam, Stiglitz, 2000; Beck, Lundberg,  Majnoni,
001)  T.It  c-ncliicet  that deeper financialv  sytems - at leat unp to a certain noint - do
seem  Lo  UV able  to  insulatLe ecUUVIUIe  against  e  La  L  O  VL  o  shIock.  TJh  L-tLLion  posed
in this paper can be seen as addressimg tte same question out along adiferent almensions.
of banking sector quality.
While the presence of reputable foreign banks is usually held to contribute to the
institutional strength of the banking system (cf. Levine,  1996), heavy reliance on foreign
banks could be destabilizing if they introduce or transmit foreign shocks to a greater
extent than they absorb shocks of domestic origin.
Schematically  we can see the banking system as a filter through which foreign
an.d dorlmestic shocks feed L'1o0ug  to the dom.estic econo.my.  Tae filter cAn  Aov,en  or
amplify the shocks, through various credit market channels including credit growtn,
The mainr qnurne  nfmnat nfthic data is the Wnrld Rank'c qurvev nf  reoultinan (Rarth-Canrin-Levine
2001a)
3import of foreign capital and possibly interest rates.  Our question is whether the
prudential  quality of banking, as proxied by measures of regulatory quality and of
openness to foreigm  bnvking, amplify or dampen thzese  shocks.  Barth, Caprio, and Levine
,e.----  o  _  .e.,  _______U.___1  .- s__e  s  _t1  _:.1z
LVUU ID)  lOUIU  LUUL sUmr apt;{;  ul  UIC;  [;g,ULUIy ;lUVLrU1U11IIL tau uIp  ILUU 5LLU4LtW
increased financial depth as well as reduce the likelihood of fmancial crises, and here we
look at whether the same or other features of the regulatory environment can dampen
short-term macroeconomic volatility.
Although it is hard to identify a statistically clear role for different aspects of the
regulatory environment among the many factors influencing overall macroeconomic
volatility, when we look at the way in which banking system balance sheets evolve in
respanse to shocks; we do find systematic natterns.  Ln general; many of the regulatorv
chte.t  t have been fnd.A  +t  Adepe  a  Cincn-al  stea  ...  r.  l,a  it  .. mo:e r,lobt
Ik1a1a%,%V,L 1LaL1,  LUQCL JiiLaV%,  U%,.IJ  IL%JLU1L%S  &%J  CS~.J~L  A1U  JI  11UAL&  .OJ  .L~LA  I4fl  ..  **V  -..  f- -
to crises -- notably tnose which empower the private sector -- also appear to reduce the
sector's ability to provide short-term insulation to the macroeconomy.  It is as if prudent
bankers are reluctant to absorb short-term risks that might cause solvency and growth
problems in the longer run.  But this apparent trade-off can be avoided: banking systems
which have a higher share of foreign-owned banks, already a feature associated with
financial  deepening and lowered risk of crisis, also seem to score well in terms of short-
term macroeconomic  insulation.
Tn the next section, we review sone of the earlier efforts to addiress these issues=
Sectio-n 3 fl-10ws -Wi'Ul new emILpinui  WUIk,  aiU sec.Lon It corcludes  wiUth auviCe  oru
policymakers.
4II.  Banking on stability: what do we know?
..no  degree  of  regulatory  wisdom  could;  or  should-  have  made  the  1920s  a
profitable time for banks in agricultural regions affected  by drastic  declines in prices
arLdJ  laUdU  V  VuTes...'V  LIL  1UrGLUL1.AJL.Vn  co  V  .hve  dor,e,  bULtL  did  LLVo  d,  LV  mk  ILNh  UJe
system as  a whole  less  susceptible  to  shocks  and  more resilient  in its  response  to
failures.  Calomiris,  1989
There has been little disagreement that one of the important goals of banking and, more
generally, finance is to help individuals and society cope with changing economic
,rpuilmat~ant'  (Tp.  u;n  19  ?Q7)  On.  of the mn.t hbasic  firlnotinne of ,fin§nn,  .nnmplu the
mobilization of za-vmgs,  itslfi  represenits a way for  MUUIVIUuLLS  Lo PtULMc  UiIiCisCVUS  frUm
economic downturns.  And from the (small business) man on the street, looking for a
loan, to the sophisticated consumer of derivative products, the function of transforming
risk (reducing it through aggregation  and enabling it to be carried by those better able to
bear it) also is a key way to deal with economic volatility (World Bank, 2001).
But is banking a source of stability? Although they note that the distinction can be
overdrawn, Allen and Gale (2000) suggest that markets tend to be destabilizing, whereas
banks and other intermediaries,  by virtue of being able to re-contract more seamlessly,
help toe+al7  co.me  AA  d  at  lpeast theoreic*a!!y, bar bs sholo  be f  ard=!ot-mg
in their decisions.  Tney snould nold a well diversifiea portfolio, taKing provisions and
holding capital in order to ensure their survival.  Banking and the building of special
relationships does not fit with the perfectly competitive model, and bank charters have a
value, which bankers can capture by making sure that they survive.  Failure in banking,
as in other industries, can send valuable signals and should be permitted, but there is a
reduction in information capital when banks shut down, so that society suffers some loss.'Bad' banks are those that risk failure either deliberately or through myopic decisions on
riQl-tadinar  hit at lps.qt in this thenretinl  appnrnoa  cy,nti hbnisr1  will n1 tweigh the had.
Nlevel'hUeless,  it  is  nIIL  WIULOUL  oI11e  irony  U14L  ill  IU,aly UbIaUrin  crises  - :  4V  Uh  UI
1920s and 1930s, among other episodes - it has been noted that the banking sector itself
appears to have acted to amplify risks rather than to help mitigate them.  What could
cause such amplification?
Some have argued that regulators  are to blame: by tightening capital regulations
or raising provisioning standards after a boom is already well underway, or indeed after
one has begun collapsing, banks may be induced to vary their lending in a pro-cyclical
fashion  (cf  Berger et al., 2001).  And some features of the  1988 Basle Accord, such as
+lie lo^,1,m  r4.  w,l  'ii,a  for  nhr.,.e  r.  A  creit,  air.d  ;"A;-;Aiio11%y be sensible fo: brkso  biit
coueciuveIy can mnauce an  screased rdUto O snorL-ierm Io  woI  a  e o  ana tnereiore greayer
financial fragility, meaning more economic volatility.
Others claim that the rating agencies are the culprits: by downgrading companies
or countries after a slowdown has already begun, an application of existing capital
standards in most countries would automatically  lead to a tightening of credit conditions.
Although the evidence suggests that rating agencies do a respectable job of anticipating
companies'  misfortunes, they appear to perform less well when it comes to country risk
(cf  Ferri- Liu and Mainoni- 2001).
A  -A  still other  -ue  +U.+  It  iS  +Ue Ue-s-  *uhemselve  . =in  lmlIglk riiIU alu1iJ  'JU1141  M  CU5ui  ULGL  IL 10UIV  LU  O  UIALIM  1  UIl-  1  I VV  "AIJA'LLU  L5  Ir  Ii1LI,
behavior.  Tnis behavior could be entirely rationaL. Errors in judgment may be punished
more severely, both by the market and by internal compensation schemes: when the bank
or the analyst makes a mistake in isolation, adverse consequences may be moresianificant than one made in good company.  Alternatively, the manner in which bank
executives  are copensated could mnore actively lead to npterntiaI prn_r  vrli'a  lepnding  if
compensation  is oaseu on uie snort-run performance  o0b  DaiK SLOcK priceS,  Uue meiCurLLial
tendency of markets will be transmitted directly to banks (John, Saunders,  and Senbet,
2001).
Volatility, regardless of its source, is a legitimate source of concern in a world of
less than complete markets, because individuals cannot costlessly enter into contracts for
all conceivable  states of the world.  This statement holds with particular force in
emerging market countries where the variety of financial services available tends to be
more limited than in more advanced countries-  Moreover- real- nominal- and financial
Voliclity all  cui  g.ea'.e;A1  1ir.emerging11r, 111ua.LS  .Ur  I  Ldue  to  hslle;  sie  . Lar.Id  U.IJY
greater economic concentration (Caprio-Honohan,  1999, and World Bank, 2001), so if
volatility matters in high-income economies,  it must have been an even greater source of
concern for developing countries.
Bernianke  and Gertler (1989) and Gertler and Rose (1994) note that shocks to net
worth can translate  into a greater real volatility in the presence of credit market
imperfections.  The more significant are information problems, the more bankers will rely
on the collateralizable  net worth of borrowers, changes in which can lead to simultaneous
pvnanrncn or chrinInuPa  nfhWnlk hbann_e shppts, lead(Iina to creatpr vnbItlitv nfrea! ;nronm
anaI  11iation,  aunu  uLLus  ateleung  cionoiinuu  weLxre.  K<iyoaid  anu ivioure  ki yy 7)  aiso noLC
that such imperfections can increase the effects of temporary shocks and contribute to
their persistence.  The assumption that these imperfections are more pronounced in
developing  countries, consistent with the well-known lack of financial  developmentthere, makes it all the more likely than emerging markets will be particularly affected by
greater volatility.  Banking is also important because for most countries it is the primary
channel to break the link between domestic investment and savings, thereby permitting a
morer  eff.icint alloartiosn  oef.capital  wowrldoide.
So now can countries achieve  a banKing sector - more 'good' banks and fewer
bad ones -- that mitigates, rather than magnifies economic volatility?  Here the answers
are thought to be well-known:  adopt international best practices for everything  from
accounting and corporate governance to bank regulation and supervision.  In addition to
suffering from some circularity (essentially telling developing countries that they would
become richer if only they adopted the institutional framework that advanced countries
evolved over many generations), these recommendations  for best practices are based
exclusivelv on 'armchair emnpircism='
~~~~.-U  .U.  Ap-  A  . :-t  T  .- A.'  -- A  ..... 
'.Jll  aL1VV%,I  iiiiLIJIL  UI.,  LV  V%AA%J1LI~.111U  V  1UJ~Li11W1CLL%1C.L)L..4  ~  "Ai~U~~UJM
Majnoni (2001)  find that although real sector shocks are dampened as financial systems
develop, monetary shocks are amplified: firms depend more on external resources with
significant financial sector development, which exposes them more to monetary or
financial shocks. 2 But this still begs the question of whether countries with deep
financial systems are equally capable of dampening even some forms of volatility.  Are
some types of deep financial system more effective in this respect than others?
To fill this void, Barth-Caprio-Levine  (2001b) collect data on regulatory and
sup1rvisory pra  ti^es aroulnd the world and find that nuimerous  regculatory featulres,  such
as regulatory barriers to baik entry, regulatory restrictions on bank activities,  greater
2 Easterlv. Islam and Stizlitz. (2000) found that volatilitv decreased with financial sector development  until
very high levels of development are reached when volatility appears to grow.
8supervisory power, and government ownership of banks are positively associated with
government corruDtion except when political onenness is pronounced: for most countries..
rn.fnfo  sup.  risory  ann,v  snr  go  x,niths nroat.e: narrnrt.  an  ar.d n,vro:se  iutran, 00  sfar  onb
development and stability.  More positively, they nnd that reguiaiory and supervisory
strategies that focus on empowering the private sector (improving transparency and
disclosure) and limiting the adverse incentive effects from generous deposit insurance
work best to promote bank performance  and stability.  An additional feature of the
regulatory environment that helps bank stability is found in their analysis to be the ability
of foreign banks to enter the local market.  In Barth-Caprio-Levine  (2001b), the
dimension in which stability is measured refers to banking crises.  But even if no crisis
oCniirz  hbanking can nerfnrm an inRiilating fiinctinn- aq iq examined figrther helonw
Most+  o*U'e  approachLes tou:  usinfcso  n:vv  as,  cud  evenq.
.VLVUOL  VUL&J1  U  LFGid1  Lv  Ua1  cqueuvui  fUI..aU  UULi  UiLLuvLuu  cU4I  a.LUse
individual features of the regulatory environment.  Jordan, Peek, and Rosengren  (2000)
find that U.S. banks which disclose less information then encountered  more severe
market reaction on eventual announcement and that this reaction was potentially
contagious.  In other words, better disclosure was at least consistent with lower volatility
in the stock market prices of these banks.  An earlier effort by Peek and Rosengren
(1995) found that banks holding low capital ratios were forced to cut back more on their
real estate portfolio in bad times, suggesting that bad banking can indeed exacerbate real
Other research has examined The impact oI foreign banks, either in their offshore
activities or onshore in industrial and emerging markets.  Goldberg (2001) uses bank-
specific data on U.S. bank lending to foreign countries,  and finds that, while in general
9these are not sensitive to local output and interest rate conditions in emerging markets,
the volume of U.S. bank claims on foreign countries is quite sensitive to changes in U.S.
conditions.  This finding echoes that of Peek and Rosengren (2000), who established how
JTanese hailra  milljla  harkIr fwdnm  T  T  leni,Engic  ir. th.e  1  OOn9  a,.  th2at thk.e r-trv wm.kmPhnt had
reai economic effects im seiect U.S. reai esiate marKets.  ims suggests uiat ioreign barnks
may help mitigate the effect of domestic shocks but could amplify the impact of foreign
shocks. Those results were strongly driven by cross-border banking activities;  in contrast,
local operations of foreign-owned banks may be less ambiguous in their contribution to
stability.  For example, Crystal, Dages, and Goldberg (2001) find that in Argentina,
Chile, and Columbia, foreign-owned banks showed not only high but more stable loan
growth and higher capital asset ratios.  This important finding strongly suggests that
foreign-owned banks provide stability and do so as a result of their greater financial
OLU-."'LI1L  F%11,JLJIF  UO  VV%,11  V4AL4%  LLAj  ML , U%.LL%,l  1%,ULLJLLV,%L  %JJ  I  ~L ".I.,  '.VW'1  GUIWJL%%i~
less myopic.3
To summarize then, the literature provides some hope that certain aspects of the
banking environment can help reduce volatility in emerging markets.  In the next section
we look at data on bank lending behavior in a wide cross-section of countries to see what
light it throws on this issue.
3 C!r ke, Cull, and Martinez-Peria  (2001)  aln shnw that anreqq tn credit hy  mall- and mediurn-smRle
enterprises  is  greater with a higher foreign banking presence.  Since many countries have resorted to
expensive directing credit programs to solve this access problem, this finding would also suggests that
foreign bank entry  improves long-term stability as well.
10III  Using Aggregate  Balance Sheet Data to Assess  the Insulating Potential of the
Banking System
If a banking system acts to stabilize or destabilize macroeconomic aggregates, this
should become evident in the way in which the size and composition of its balance sheet
evolves in response to shocks.  In this section we look at the short-term dynamics of
banking-system balance sheets as they change from quarter-to-quarter.  In contrast to
previous work examining the probability of crises -- relatively rare events occurring
nprhanoe  nnp nr turiwn  in a nmlqrtPr-.  nt-lirv  -- ofur ga!n  is tn examine the ability nf  hanking
systLewLs to iis-ulalte  .iU-L1qur.LLy ULUU  baUnce.
T  lhis goal requires linking two distinct sources of data, namely quarterly baiance
sheet aggregates and information on structural characteristics of the banking systems.
For the latter, we use the database of Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001a), which defines the
outer margins of our sample of countries.  For the former, we turn to International
Financial  Statistics (IFS).
IIII.  Simplired Banking Svstem  Balance Sheets
TI.xrn upnonn what is  in p%r.inrpleP  a  icnmmnn e-t nf defintions  IS  c-o.ntsine
monetary survey data on well over a h-ulndred  wuliulueL,  Una4UUU1  Vhl.UUtL  t11 of Ut
countries for which we have banking quality data.  Our focus is on the component data
for deposit-money banks, not including the monetary authorities.  But the balance sheet
classifications of the monetary  survey are too numerous to allow for a cross-country
study without considerable consolidation and rationalization.  A total of 44 distinct
balance sheet category codes are included in the monetary survey, though any given
country only has entries against a subset of these, typically fewer than twenty.  Even 20classifications is much too detailed a breakdown for the purpose at hand, namely to
understand the influences on the broad allocation of different sources of funds to different
1 nereioret  wu nave simpliieu anu ConsoluateU  Lthe  Ua-w i-lou  a s1implifu IUFIIItIL,
the same for all countries, distinguishing between just six broad categories with
convenient notation as follows:
Assets  L
a  loans and advances  c  capital
b  bills and other liquid investments (net)  d  deposits and deposit-type  instruments
e  net other liabilities
f  net foreign liabilities
Here a ("advances"  - though we use the term interchangeably with loans) equals
total domestic credit, including claims on central, state and local governments (these
expressed net of deposits), public enterprises, nonmonetary financial  institutions and the
private sector.  The remaining  asset-side item b ("bills") includes bank reserves net of
credit to banks from the monetary authorities.  The item c "capital"  is the entry under
canitl  acinnte in  IR.^  it  doens nnt in a!i  nnces  mrreqnnnd  tn recmIntnrv caniti lintder the
B  1asel  conveifions.  X L'e  I*uJmjor  iteML  UI  UVIL  LiaUbL1L1  1d  "e  Upsits,"  whrn,.IcIudIesIIU  nUoL
only demand and time deposits (other than the public sector deposits aiready netted out of
a) but also money market and other liquid liabilities.  The residual item e also includes
bonds issued by banks.  Net foreign liabilitiesf is self-explanatory.  Detailed definitions
are included in the Annex: "Consolidating the monetary survey".
Over time, each of the elements of the balance sheet evolve, but at any given
moment, the balance sheet identity is satisfied by the data for each country:
a+h=e+d+e+,fThis identity reflects not only the nature of banking transactions  but also the fact
that valuation chanoes (such ac changes in loan-loss nrovisionning) give rise to offsettinL
chgesr,V~a  Ln  L1  L L+ent  LUi,  capJital.
in order to look at the evolution of the typical balance sheet structure in our data
set, we express each element as a percentage of the sum of the two asset items  a + b
(advances plus bills).  In interpreting the resulting ratios, note that this denominator is not
the same as the balance sheet total.  For one thing, borrowing from the central bank is
netted out of "bills".  Also, foreign assets are netted from the liability figure "foreign
liabilities".  With this caveat, we see from Figure 1 that deposits dominate the liabilities
and advances the assets side of the mean portfolio structure.4 The other four elements
are,  n averag  rath,-r cmslI  VMPvPrth1PQe  wh.en  wp  look at the variatiAn both. het.wpn
coUDnILe  duU UVa  L LdV  o  i  7(199-200),  WU  UdiLsVVer  ultL ech  of uLU SIAe  le  mnts
contributes approximately the same amount (Figures 2a and 2b).  This confirms that none
of the elements of the chosen grouping of balance sheet items can be ignored in
understanding the portfolio dynamics.
Over time, there has been a trend towards declining relative importance of the two
large items, advances and deposits, as shown in Figure 3a, which shows the value for the
median country at each date.  Each of deposits and advances has trended downwards at a
rate of between 0.5 and 0.7 percent noints ner annum.  The slack has been taken un by an
increase in net liquidity on the  asset side and  1maiLy  by capital  itemLs on the liability side
Figure 3b).  Tnese trends presumably reflect increased reguiatory emphasis on capitai and
liquidity, as well as to a shift away from the use of discount lending by central banks.
4  r  I-------  - I  - -~  -… ne fgure snows uIc mii o-ver 7 i co-unuies for  achn couniry s mcan on quariwy  atn  uuring  i9y9Qi-
2000Q4.We also notice that fluctuations in the balance sheet aggregates are sizable:
movements of several percentage  points even for the median of over 70 countries:
intdielvlida  cou  ntries exper-enced  much more volatility.
SO  WIaL  Ia.t  aU1  ULLd  UL  L:Us VUlaUlILl, a.1U LIhW  UV  UIhe  VaIy  Ga  Uy  b--el
different types of banking system?
Figure  1
hban balance sheet structure
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16III.2  Using the monetary survey data to assess the banking system's absorptive
capacity.
Deposit shocks can be severe, as witness the dramatic experiences in Argentina in
1994-95 and again during 2001, when deposits fell by over 20 per cent and 10 per cent
respectively, or in Turkey in 1994.  The heightened depositor uncertainty which they
typically imply can reflect heightened lender uncertainty  also, but even if the bank
lenders do not have a heightened sense of lending risk, they will have to find alternative
sources of funding if they are not to shrink their loan portfolio in response to a
withdrawal of deposits.  Fluctuations in loans in turn can drive macroeconomic
flctuationsn  SO  w.e want to know whether the banking syste-m dnoe  in fiAt  t to insulate
*e  VUIoLL-r  Uk  iofar  iLumL  cAexogen-ious shocks in dUepsJitL,  WIUL  Ule piU.JL11pL1UionU  ULd  such1
insulation is socially beneficial.
Even if  deposits remain stable, disturbances in loan-loss experience can affect the
banks' capitalization.  This in turn will lead to other portfolio adjustments including
fluctuations  in lending impacting the macroeconomy.  Here again we want to know if  the
banks are prone to cutting-back on new loans simply because of loan-losses  (as distinct
from cuffing-back in a prudent response to heightened risk.)  If they do so, this is likely to
exacerbate an economic downturn and as such be socially undesirable.
Tn the case  bo%th of shocks to deposits and to capita,  it is evide.nt that simltaneity
and ifeedback wil; be a cruciai issue.  r or exampie,  a poor narvest wiii tena to affect Dom
credit demand and deposits, without there being any causality from the latter to the
former.  In what follows we use standard econometric techniques to correct for this
problem.
17Before attempting to capture the magnitude of these effects and how they may
differ as between different tvpes of countrv, it may be convenient to sketch the formal
fir.Pw.rlk  .wh~eti,h cliI  be. iin.Arti  our gne?irally~  h 1 ,^atf 1 7e appr~cr~h fro the~  j~eor.ore;c
niodluuig.
A modelingframework
Let us denote the vector of balance sheet items as x=(a,b,c,d,eJ)'. In a
competitive environment, each bank can be thought of as choosing a value  x* to
optimize an expected profit function xr4(x,r) in response to an exogenous expected vector
of returns r (and subject to the adding-up condition x'l=1, where I is the unit vector).
More generally,  in a non-comnetitive  environment- the banks may choose an optimal
ruv.i  {v*  v*N  al^"n a Av-A  -- fan.  A f-  wfl  V;nlh,  1.  .I,  -1  1-  1-
.'~L1~  ~,  ~)  ~4Jfl  ~.4L1I4A~4~  "  I  f,F,  J-U.  I  IGLI,U  iL%1LU  oLI  4.UCUILL1LJ  YIU'L.%A  Q
well as price-takers  for some oI Thle elements of the baiance sneet, in that they may, for
example, be required to accept all deposits presented to them at a parametric  rate of
return.  If so, the optimal portfolio will be conditional on the actual value of the deposits
received. In practice, there may also be adjustment costs, so that the actual value of x
may deviate from the optimized value, notably if  there is some shock to the exogenous
rates of return and/or the given flow of deposits.
If we only have data on the quantities and not on the rates of return, we cannot
hope to estmate the profit finction or the demand sumrf_ces.  But, wuith some firther
assur-uptionS,  We car. %-aW  Uo.LU  imULLtLereU  as  LU  Uhe  LVro  VI  Uof  UeaL'I-ng  bybLr.11  in
contributing to macroeconomic  stability.
18For example, if banks are quantity-takers  for deposits, then shocks to aggregate
deposits d must be absorbed by some or all of the other elements of the balance sheet.
(There may also be price  Ai,xitrnpentel  If the  aduiiatmpeit is thrmuah a changep  i  the net
ioreign niaDiuityj,  wiun  no chnange  mi  ihe ievei  o0 advances  a uitn uie  anrKing systcm  is
completely insulating the level of advances from shocks to the level of deposits.
According to the credit view of monetary transmission, it is through changes in
loans and advances that the banking system has its biggest short-run5 impact on the
macroeconomy.  If so, it is of interest to compare the degree to which deposit shocks are
passed through to advances, or whether the banking system acts to insulate advances.  In
practice, of course, much of the dollar value of shifts in deposits typically passes through
to advancesj which are normally the largest element of the asset side of the balance sheet.
Ato  advoo coesi-  whm  are.,t  noml  tn  laroest elmnf  fAetofthe  ase  s aof  the 0 nhaffl  heet
wi'thn banking quality vanables  ?
Response of  loans and advances tofluctuations in deposits.
Naturally, being the largest balance sheet elements, deposit and loan fluctuations
tend to be highly correlated over time and across countries. We regressed the quarterly
logarithmic change in a on the contemporaneous change in d for our panel of 74
countries,  1990-2000.  A simple OLS regression a coefficient of 0.78 with a standard
error of little over 0.01 (Table la: Eqution 1.1).  Of course,simulltaneity  bias may be
present and we lookUIL at U  uu  L:UHVuM  ly.
5  Annn.A  to the. flnanra nAd  nrn*th lHtp"tnn  1-e  -ad  -d  un-.a .r  the Vey nh--nol  f-a  4...
to growth.
19Taking this estimate at face value suggests that a fall in deposits of 10 per cent
will pass through to advances to the extent of 7.8 per cent.  This is the average over all
countries.  The next auestion is whether this pass-through is affected by the nature and
qttity ofL11  --  b  e  ai  - rdb  +lk-  presr.c  offo  -grar- qul  L, U  .LJC.L'  %rtICLU1&L  I  W&IL&  UIY  L  I  LI,  IJI 1W  %I6IU  UWlBa.
However, when we allow the coefficient  on d to vary depending on the value of
the banking quality variables by adding cross-product terms one-by-one to the equation,
we find significant effects, many of them positive, suggesting that banking system quality
does influence the pass-through and can actually tend to destabilize loans and advances in
6 the short-run.  An exception is foreign ownership, which tends to insulate advances from
deposit shocks.
In order to interpret these regressions, we take our cue from Barth, Caprio and
Levine (0001  h)  thoulgh with q eliohtlv different nperenrtive given the different rcncerne
at hand.  Our"  - -e--ce  is trhat bank-ing system.s  Uhat arL subject to effective m;onitorin.g
by market forces or by non-discretionary official bodies are more likely to adjust their
lending in response to deposit fluctuations for fear of falling foul of the oversight.
Although shareholders may have different views about increasing the leverage of their
bank (which would occur if a fall in deposits were made-up at the expense of the quantity
or quality of capital), those who are creditors to the bank will prefer to see the lending
portfolio shrink because they otherwise would be more exposed to loss and enjoy no
uDside Rain from increased risk.
Tn  -nnftret  hbnnling avst.mo  eilhupnt  mn,iniv tn (iwrpetioAnnrv  nuprdiht by nffir-1
__  ___s__  /____  S.t!_!___  1_  _  !_1L  ----  -. 1__.___.\  --- I1  _  __11_1__  regulators  evull  11 ts  invulvu  high Capial reqUirmnls) Wlll  bU  murC likly  ur  UbteLr
6 This finding relates to high-freauency fluctuations  and does not contradict previous evidence that the odds
of a banking crisis are lower in such systems.
20able to smooth the impact of deposit fluctuations on loans in order to maintain the
comfortable borrowing relationship and steady flow of profits albeit at the risk of
uinlatinn vpmlatnov,  f.Ofl.f.s.
DdIlKIFIIr  bYSMLBl1  [t SLILTU  IrUM  4  WiUrr r  lgW  1  UV  01 IineS  in  UU51uUSS muy aisu ur  E
a weaker position to insulate their borrowers from deposit tluctuations (e.g. by being
unable to switching resources from the other lines).  Finally, banking systems with
foreign ownership may be better placed to intermediate or raise capital from abroad,
thereby insulating the domestic borrowers from domestic deposit shocks.
This gives us predicted signs for each group of variables as shown in the first
column of Table 1.  The regression strategy for the equations reported in this table is a
very simnle one (and may need to be refined in future work).  We simplv include any or
all of th.e stnuct.ulral variables as sope-shift  (interaction)  term.s wth the (logarithmc)
cnange in deposits d.  hnese stuctural  explanatory variables are drawn from Barhn,
Caprio and Levine and are constant for each country.
In general the results are broadly consistent with the expected pattern.  We note
an especially large and statistically significant effect for the prompt corrective action
variable: in regression  1.2 this amplifies the pass through effect by over one third, this
suggests that such action may tend to induce a regulatory credit-crunch.  The effect of
foreign ownership - a kind of buffer which reduces the pass-through from deposits to
loans nawin lv more thnn a thirtd  iq alsn highly 6icmifircnt  whPthFr innhidi1d with the
O'luer vaLlab:es (regressbionL  1.2) VI oni  sL -wLi7 klugicbbiors  1.10V).  uuiferwis,  'UIF  oriiy
deviations from predicted signs are in respect of private monitoring (unexpected sign, but
21anyway insignificant), the official regulatory powers variable which has the expected sign
in the multivariate regression, but changes sign when included on its own (regression
1.5), and the line of business restrictions variable,  insignificant in the multivariate
specifications, but with an unexpected sign when included on its own.
ThPes  OUS  rTeiiltq need tn he suhiected  tn rohijqtnfhe  teqtq of variniq sorts.  One
__  *  ~~~~~~~~~1 *  __  __. _*1  ,  -AL-_1L  .1  *  - A-  =  esse5VUlil  is tLu corr  Le  lu  l  urS1HUtaJiVY  Ula,  WiiJill  WV, UV  Uy  U  umu.i.L.LUar.  1o  ul.  c.U  ge
in deposits (the list of instruments are shown in the notes to Table 2).  When only tie
instrumented change in deposits is included (regression 2.1)  the coefficient  is now higher,
suggesting approximately  1 for I pass-through. Once again, when the other explanatory
variables are added, the pattern of signs is broadly in line with expectations - in fact more
so, inasmuch as the unexpected sign on official powers in regression 2.5 is now wholly
insignificant.  The line of business restrictions are now significant in the multivariate
regressions with the expected sign.  The index of private monitoring also now enters
sl.ificanntly  i,uuth  th.e exp  PrtPAi  cni 8  T6h  pedtmntp.i- Pffpet of nrnmnt rnrrentive action
remains sigriicarn,  L[1UUg1l  smllaLllir,  Is  igir.  I IIm I  oIfPM  Vo LeIuigr, UWIr.IvlIp is  aJls
smaller and is now insignificant in the multivariate specification, though it remains
significant on its own in regression 2. 10.
Evidently, the econometric model is a very simple one, and the results obtained
could be fragile to variations in specification, and in particular to omitted variables bias.
Nevertheless, the results seems to confinn the fear of some authors that excessive caution
in banking could result in a worsening of the capacity of the -banking system to absorb
7'By "on its own" we mean that the variable  is included as the only slope-shift (interaction) term with the
logarithmic change in deposits.  A single constant term is included but not reported in all the regressions of
Tables  I and 2.
22deposit shocks from passing through to loans and advances in the short-run.  Thus,
somewhat paradoxically,  the type of regulation that has been shown to be relatively
ineffective in protecting banking systems from failure and in helping to develop the
banlking sy  tsm lAnu-term  cnnild heln nrnvide some shnrt-term %tiAilitv-
FreUign11  VWuIiJleUp  is  all  llIIJpILa4UL  UAVVpAIVpL.  FouUJI  uy  VUIVheJ  tL  bU  gdUU  fiV
prudential considerations,  it is also a stabilizer in the present context, likely because it
brings a benefit, greater diversification,  that adds to stability in the short and long term.
Capital  shocks and loan growth
How is loan growth affected by shocks to banking confidence?  The most obvious
way in which our balance sheet data can be used to throw light on this question is by
examining what haptens to loans after a decline in bank capital.  Do banks raise their
,creAt  ctanfarfwk  thprPhi  dnuiowna  Innv  ovrn%uAh9  Timing ic imnnrtnnt here.  A  revs-nluation
01  tLfl  loan pOnLi`O1  1010o-Wirlg  I-eUUgI1UUIi  VI  loUU  loUsse  1i  a  IIuJUL soUrUc  o1  VariatiUnl  in
bank capital.  This is a mechanical accounting effect, and not one which we wish to
confuse with a behavioral response of lending to heightened portfolio risk and reduced
capitalization.  Therefore, in contrast to the deposit effect, which we allowed in the
previous section to be simultaneous within the same quarter, we need to examine changes
in a which follow changes in c. Capital can also change for other reasons, including new
issues, retained earnings etc.  So it is at best a very noisy indicator of  confidence based on
recent loan-loss ex.pnriPenceP (and onnpe  niild dna lot hbtter wix*th more detirt.Ad innirnm
staternenL  UaL')  UUL  IL iN  UIC  l10lssL  Luling  in  'uh  uatasetL  w  ar  usUig here.
8 One of the components of this index captures the role of rating agencies, often thought to induce a Dro-
cyclical tendency.
23Assuming that the confidence  impact changes occur mainly in the year following
a change in capital, we adopt the change in capital over the four previous ouarters as our
r;.in  0VV£l c1no*r~~,ar.  v  1  - Xa.r,  . f.  .n.  I  o...  o.  Ad  .be  I  .ed  In
preliminary effort,  we nave chosen io restrict tie impact to be the same for each of the
four quarters (relaxing the restriction risks increasing  omitted variables bias in these
lightly specified equations).  Also, instead of the logarithmic rate of change,  we express
the change in capital c as a ratio of the contemporaneous loan stock a.  Finally, we report
regressions corrected for first-order autocorrelation.
The results are in Table 3.  The patterns obtained confirm those of the previous
section.  Foreign ownership is again a stabilizing factor, perhaps in this case also
refle-tinga greaterability bv foreign-owned  banks to access capital  A!o stabilizing (to
a  IC;LU  is  A  pdlnta  rlelil  lUUlliUlgUlaiUUo.  Jn UontratL,  Uth  measbUr  of
private prudential strength tend to be associated with a higher pass-through of capital
changes to lending, as are restrictions on line of business.
Bank foreign borrowing and  deposit shocks
One way of insulating a national banking system from shocks is to offset these
shocks by trading in the international capital market.  Deposit withdrawals can be
replaced. by healthy banks. with funds drawn from the international money market.
T  ilr:se,  a  sirnli  nfAdp,i,%ct fi,nAan Iar.  bpl,acedA  "i +lhe i  e  o,r;a  ;i
potentially inporiant form- of insulation provided by a banKing system tiai is well
integrated with the world financial markets.  Using our data, a small modification of the
24method already applied throws light on the extent to which foreign borrowing has in
practice been used  in this way.
Linh  irreionsjvL  ivpvuI  Lin  1  av  Tae  4  adiu  J  LAjuI  5  exipainchan  LUe  iUr  L  nt1UiVi
liabilities of the banking system (the change normalized, as in the figures above, as a
share of the total of a+b) as a function of the logarithmic change in deposits.  The same
explanatory variables (slope-shifts) are used as before.  A banking system that offsets
deposit outflows with foreign borrowing will have a negative coefficient on the change in
deposits (level effect).  Slope-shift factors that increase the insulation will show up with
negative  coefficients.
Table 4 shows the OLS results.  Once again the pattern is generally as expected
from the farnmework discusedA  above.  On average,  additional  foreigr.  borroing as a
SiWrC  I  Lofl  n  IeILc  sLheeL  pseuUto-Ltoaia  a-  aou  is aVo.  II  per  CetL  01  LUC  logarnUUnnie  change
in deposits, implying that about 15 per cent  of the deposit shock is insulated on average
(regression 4.1).  The multivariate regression 4.2 has the expected values for all of the
coefficients, and displays a very strong insulating effect from foreign ownership.
However, turning to Table 5, a caveat is indicated, as the results do not come
through as clearly for the 2SLS estimates.  The signs are mostly the same, but size and
significance have fallen.  (The line-of-business restrictions variable is significant but with
an unexnected  siPn).  Also the R-squared  values are low - some of them not even
satListicaUly  sa1igifIcantL%  uasLr  F-tests.  L1U  suggests  UhaL uih  iuUILLnILo  have  IUL  Vben
strong enough to identify the actual effects reliably.Nevertheless, the main conclusion that foreign ownership is a stabilizing force,
while other regime features known to be good for long-term prudential  and financial
developme.nt  goals, are not.
IV.  Conciuding Remarks
Previous work on prudential banking policy has rightly emphasized the
importance of placing a great deal of reliance on the risk management capacity and
incentive of informed market participants.  That is the way to reduced risk of crisis and to
long-term financial deepening.
At the same time, there remains a nagging concern that tightly-managed banking
systems could under perform in terms of insulating the macroeconomy from short-term
volat.ility.  Our analysis of qiirterly aggregatke bankinrg balance shept datn from over 70
counties  suggesLs  ULl tiiseucUnlrs ar  HnUL  aLUge  tr -WIUIUUL  IUfrUdaLiVoL.  i UlV
seeming paradox between the short-term and long-term effects of some features of the
regulatory environment can be readily dispelled, as it likely is that by forcing greater
adjustment to short-term changes, private monitoring may be better at preventing the
build up of large losses.  Unless either markets or officials become able to forecast
accurately which shocks are permanent  and which are transitory, a policy of quicker
adjustment of loans to deposits appears to be the better way to ensure the medium-term
stahilitv of the economy and the banking svstem, admittedly at the expense of the short-
LIZL.I ZLaU1LY  of  Ule  iI%Jio..
Fortunately, there appears to be one tooi that authorities can use to improve botn
short-term and long-term stability, and that is greater reliance on foreign ownership.
26Greater foreign ownership appears to add diversification to all economies, large and
small, hut is esnecially important to the many small economies around the world.
A  -G1,an-l  foreign.  en+ntr  i  r.e  pop  -an  r.+h1 th  ,-na.,+  -op.-  of+1,0  - - --  sste..
fI1UILULV&rii  1VJL%.w15LL %1LI  3L  13  1.  JL%V%,1JJUJL  FvvJLL  VVLUJL L.M,  %U1Lw11L  L  J  VVV11%IJL  3  J.  L11I  LCU11E%11"J  .Y 
as noted in a recent report (World Bank, 2001), authorities need to recall tnat what
matters for growth and development is access to good quality financial services, not who
provides them.
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30Table  1: Sensitivityf lending to changes in deposits- OL  Sregressions
Equation  nci:  1.1  1.2  1.3  1.4  1.5  1.6  1.7  1.8  1.9  1.10
Level elffect  0.78 (67.5)  0.69 (34.3)  0.66 (46.2)  0.76 (62.2)  0.76  (61.3)  0.79 (67.2)  0.78 (67.5)  0.66 (47.4)  0.78 (67.6)  0.83 (47.1)
Capital  rules (-)  -0.02  (1.5)  -0.04  (2.8)  -0.09  (7.2)
Official regulatory powers (-)  -0.04 (2.5)  -0.06  (3.9)  0.07 (6.6)
Private  monitoring (H-)  -0.02 (1.4)  -0.01  (0.9)  -0.01  (0.7)
Entry standards (+)  0.02 (1.8)  0.03  (2.2)  0.04  (4.-5)
Prompt corrective  action (+)  0.25  (12.2)  0.24  (:12.2)  0.22 (14.7)
Line of business restrictions (+)  -0.01  (0.6)  -0.02  (1.2)  -0.04 (3.6)
Foreign ownership (-)  -0.24 (3.6)  -0.25 (3.7)
R-sguaredD/  DW  0.616 2.10  0.6560 2.02  0.647 2.01  0.623 2.08  0.622  2.09  0.616 2.10  0.619 2.09  0.643 2.04  0.618 2.08  0.62 2.12
Sample:  PooI74: 74 Countries; Quarterly data 1990Q1 -2000Q4; iMethod:  Pooled Least Squares
The estimated equation is Atn(a,-a,.1 )a+p  AIn(d,d,..1)+Ejyz  AIn(dtrd,.j)*zj.  The  "leve'l effect"  is  the  coeffiicient a.
The explanatory variables zj are Capinlexpc, Officialpc, Privtepc,  Entrhpc, Promptpc, Reshtictpc and Fo,reignown.  Expected sign slhown in parenthesis in first column.
31_____  Table 2: Sensitivty  fending to  ge  in deposits: 2  5Lr essions
Equalion no:  2.1  2.2  2.3  2.4  2.5  2.6  2.7  2.8  2.9  2.10
Level effect  1.04 (44.8)  0.95 (22.8)  0.91  (26.2)  0.98 (36.2)  1.03 (38.6)  1.00  (41.3)  1.02  (41.2)  0.96 (29.7)  1.02 (42.0)  1.09  134.4)
Capitail rules (-)  -0.03 (1.2)  -0.04 (1.5)  -0.08 (3.5)
Official regulatory  powers ;-)  -0.08 (2.6)  -0.08 (3.0)  0.01  (0.3)
Private monitoring (+)  0. 10 (4.5)  0.09  (4.9)  0.08  (4.5)
Entry standards (+)  0.04 (1.6)  0.03  (1.3)  0.02  (1.0)
Prompt corrective action (+)  0.12 (2.9)  0.13  (3.5)  0.09 (3.0)
Line of business restrictions  (+)  0.07 (2.6)  0.08 (3.1)  0.03  (11.1)
Foreign ownership(-)  -0.09 (0.7)  -0.23 (2.1)
R-squared /)W  0.455 2.06  0.496 2.05  0.466 2.05  0.438 2.10  0.435  2.12  0.440 2.13  0.435  2.12  0.437  2.09  0.436 2.12  D.463  2.12
Sample: Pool71: 71 Countries; Quarterly data 1990Q1-2000Q4;  :Method:  Pooled Least Squares;
The estimated equation is as in Table  1,  except that Aln(d,-d,1) is replaced with its predictecd  value from a regression of AIn(dr-d,,)  on four lags of Aln(ara,. 1); Aln(drd,i1)
and Aln(,f.1) and  ithe values of Capindex, Entrytest,  Officindex, Privtmndex, Restrict and  Prompt.
The explanatory variables  zj are Capindexpc, Officialpc, Privtepc, Entrypc, Promptpc, Restrictpc  and Foreignown. Expected sign shown in parenthesis  in first columnn.
32Table 3: Sentsitivity of  lendie  n  to previous changes in capital: OLS regressions
Equatin no:  3 1  3.2  3.3  3.4  3.5  3.6  1.7  3.8  3.9  3.10
Level effect  0.59 (24.0)  0.53  (12.2)  0.40 (15.0)  0.53  (21.1)  0.55  (:22.1)  0.55  (23.0)  0.58 (23.4)  0.46 (17.4)  0.59 (23.8)  0.76 (21.6)
Capital rules  (--)  -0.05 (1.7)  -0.08 (2.8)  -0.18 (6.4)
Official regulatory powers  I(-)  -0.04 (1.1)  -0.09 (2.7)  0.12  (4.9)
Private monitoring  (+)  0.10 (4.2)  0.14 (6.5)  0.13  (6.1)
Entry standards (+)  0.02 (0.8)  0.01  (0.3)  0.01  (0.6)
Prompt corrective action (+)  0.28 (6.3)  0.31 (7.6)  0.29 (9.3)
Line of business restrictions  (+)  0.10 (3.3)  0.10 (3.9)  0.00 (0.0)
Foreign ownership (-)  -0.47 (3.3)  -0.66 (5.8)
A,R(l)  0.35  (17.5)  0.28 (12.8)  0.28 (13.3)  0.33 (16.7)  0.34 (17.3)  0.32  (15.8)  0.35  (17.5)  0.32  (16.1)  0.35  (17.5)  0.34  (16.0)
R-sjuared/DW  0.434 2.17  0.492 2.13  0.470 2.12  0.444 2.17  0.440 2.19  0.443  2.14  0.434  2.17  0.456 2.18  0.434 2.17  0.465 2.17
Sample: Pool  71: 71 Countbies; Quarterly data  1990Q1-200OQ4;  Mlethod: Autoregressive  Pooled Least Squares (Eviews);
The estimated  equation is Aln(a,-a,.1)=a+P lk44 Aln(c  c,4 1)/ a,. +Y:jyj  Y,.  Aln(ct.rc,4.i]/ a,k } *zj. Thie "level effect" is the coefficient a.
The explanatory variables zj are Capindexpc, (OIciapc,  Prhvtepc, Entrypc, Promptpc, Restrictpc and Foreignown. Expected sign shown in parenithesis in first column.
33Table  4: Rcsponse of  bankforeign borrowingo  deposit ch!s  OLe  s  regressionm
Equation no:  4.1  4.2  4.3  4.4  4.5  4.6  4.7  4.8  4.9  4.10
Level  effect  -0.1 1(14.7)  -0.15  (11.7)  -0.03  (1.4)  -0.15 (19.6)  -0.13 (16.7)  -0.11  (15.3)1  -0.11(15.1))  -0.19 (20.4)  0.11(14.8)  -0.05  (4.8)
Capital rules (-)  -0.07  (7.4)  -0.04  (2.8)  -0.12 (:14.5)
Official regulatory powers (-)  -0.02  (2.1)  -0.01  (0.8)  0.05  i(7.9)
Private monitoring (+)  0.03  (3.8)  0.04 (3.2)  0.04 (6.8)
Entry sitandards (+)  0.04  (5.6)  -0.01  (0.5)  0.03 (5. 1)
IPrompt corrective action (+)  0.10  (7.7)  0.03  (1.3)  0.13  (13.8).
Line oifbusiness restrictions  (+)  -0.04  (3.8)  -0.04  (2.8)  -0.06 (8.3)
Foreigrn ownership (-)  -0.26  (5.5)  -0.33 (7.6)
R-squared/DW  0.073  1.87  0.21  1.90  0.022 2.08  0.138  1.90  0.093  1.88  0.088  1.92  0.081  1.88  0,132  1.87  0.095  1.85  0.097  1.90
Sample: Pool7l: 71  Countries; Quarterly data 1990Q1-20CIOQ4;  Method: Pooled Least Squares;
The estimated equation is AIn(fr.f,.)/(a +b,)  -1+3 A1n(dr-d. 1)+E 1yj  AIn(d1 d ,)*zj.  The "level effect'  is the coefficient a.
The explanatory variables zj are Capinmexpc, Officialpc, Privtepc, Entrypc, Promptpc, Restrictpc and Foreignowvn. Expected sign shown in parenthesis  in first: column.
34Table 5: Responsf bankforeinorrowing  to deposit ch  nges:  2SLS regressions
Equation no:  5.1  5.2  5.3  5.4  5.5  5 6  5.7  5.8  5.9  5.10
Level effect  0.01  (0.7)  0.01  (0.3)  -0.03 (1.4)  -0.03  (1.9)  -0.06 (0.4)  -0.01  (0.6)  0.01 (1.0)  -0.03 (1.8)  0.02 (1,8)  0.01  (0.6)
Capital rules (-)  -0.03 (2.1)  -0.04 (2.8)  -0.07  (5.1)
Official regulatory pDwers(-)  -0.010  (0.1)  -0.01 (0.8)  0.03  (2.2)
F'rivate monitoring (F)  0.03 (2.2)  0.04 (3.2)  0.05 (5.2)
E!ntry standarcs (+)  -O.O (0.2)  -0.01  (0.5)  -0.02 (1.2)
Frompt corrective action (+)  0.03 (1.2)  0.03 (1.3)  0.06 (3.4)
Line of business restrictions (+)  -0.04 (2.2)  -0.04 (2.8)  -0.07 (4.9)
F'oreign ownership (-)  -0.14 (1.8)  .0.01  (:2.9)
R-squaLed / DW  0.000 2.02  0.02 2.09  0.022 2.08  0.011  2.04  0.002 2.08  0.011 2.04  0.001  2.02  0.005 2.03  0.010 2.05  0.004 2.03
Sample: Pool71: 71 Countries; Quarterly data 1990Q1-2000Q4;  Method: Pooled Least Squares;
The eslimatecl equation is as in Table 4, except that Aln(drd,.i)  is replaced with its predicted value  From a regresision  of Aln(d,-d,. 1) on four lags of  Aln(ara,.i); Aln(drd,.i)
and Ahl(f,-f.1) and the values of Capindex, Ennytest, Officijdex, Privtiruex,  Restrict  amd  Prompt.
35Data Annex:
A.  Consolidaling the JFS Monetary Survey
Here is a listing and grouping of the elements of the aggregate balance sheet of deposit money banks as reported in International
Financial  Statistics, together with their identifying codes
Bank assets  Bank liabilte
Reserves  Deposits
20+20c+20d+20n+20r  Reserves  24+24x  Dernand Deposits
Foreign  afssets  25+25.a+25a+25aa+  25b+25bb+
21  Foreign Assets  25e+251+26d(g  Time Deposits etc.' o
Domestic credit:  Money market liabilities
22a+22an  Claims on Central Govt  26a+26aa+26m  Money mlarket instrmments
22b-+221?x  Claims on State & Local  Government  Bonis
22c  Ciaims on Public Enterprises9 26b+26ab+26n  Bonlds
22d  Claims on Private Sector  Foreign ikabilities
22Jr  Claims on Nonmonetary ]FIs  26c+26cl  Foreign Liabilities
22g  Claims on Other FIs,  Government deposits
26d+26e+26f'  Government Deposits
Borrowingfronm monetary authority
26g,  Credit from Monetary Authority
Borrowingtfiom OFls
26i+26j  Credit from Other Financial Institutions
Capital
27a,  Capital Accounts
Other items
27r  Other Items (net)
9 Also 22ca;, 22cb; 22cg.  '° But not 25b for Russia, because of double-counting.
36The six aggregates  used in the statistical analysis of Section III consolidate these items as
follows (using the italicized headings of the above table:
a = Domestic credit less government deposits ("Advances")
1b  =  RAerveas  lessa  Anppr,n,,,,n Ar,%m  mnnatnr,} f,nthjri,  ("u  Bi!!s")
c = Capital
d  LDeposits pius money marKet liaililiecs  plus oorrowingjrurm  OrFI  ("Deposit")
e = Other items plus bonds  ("Net Other Liabilities")
f  = Foreign liabilities  less foreign assets ("Net Foreign Liabilities")
Then the balance sheet identity is:  a+b=c+d+e+f:
B.  The Banking Quality Variables
Tlnese variables are drawn from Bartuh, Caprio and Levine (200ia).  Iney are brIefly
summarized here:
Capital rules:  this is the variable "Capital regulatory index"  in BCL.  It is the sum of two
separate indices, one measuring whether there are explicit regulatory requirements
regarding the amount of canital that a bank must have relative to various  guidelines; the
other measuring whether the source of funds counted as regulatory  capital
incldAe  n-as+e  o'ier  *r.  cash  o1kr gv...r.rnnnt sc.te  a  4
4 n  r.d knrn,rnAd fir,d  as .ve!!  Oa
whether the sources are verified by the regulatory or supervisory authorities.
Official regulatory powers: Whether the supervisory authorities have the authority
to take specific actions to prevent and correct problems along 16 different dimensions.
Private monitoring:  Sum of the responses to the following: is a certified audit of banks
renhlirpd- frswtinn of the ton 1  0 hank- that are rated  by international rating agencies; is
reliable accounting disclosure required and is there director liability for this; absence of
explMiLi  Ueposit  Unsura..JL  cheme
Entry Standards: ("Entry into Banking Requirements"):  whether there are specific iegai
submissions required to obtain a license to operate as a bank.
Prompt Corrective Action:  whether a law establishes pre-determined
levels of bank solvency deterioration which forces automatic enforcement
actionsc  scnh  as  ir.te  r~.ition.
mine  OI business resuicuons:  Comboiies wnheuier a bank may Own shares in ai  iiuui.nuiia
firm; whether a bank can conduct securities, insurance or real estate.
Foreign ownership: the fraction of the banking system's assets that are 50%
or more foreign owned.
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